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Disorderly Differences: Recognition,
Accommodation, and American Law
Austin Sarat & Roger Berkowitz*
[H]ow will the prophecy come true that someday there will be only
one shepherd and one flock? ... [D]o not allow yourselves to be
deluded! In order to be under the care of this omnipresent shepherd
the entire flock need neither graze in one pasture nor enter and leave
the master's house through a single door. This is neither what the
shepherd wants nor advantageous to the prosperity of the flock.
Moses of Mendelssohn, Jerusalem
You do not have to be me in order for us to fight alongside each
other. I do not have to be you to recognize that our wars are the
same. What we must do is commit ourselves to some future that can
include each other and to work toward that future with the particular
strengths of our individual identities. And in order to do this, we
must allow each other our differences at the same time as we
recognize our sameness.
Audre Lorde, "Learning From the 60s," in Sister Outsider
We are not an assimilative, homogeneous society, but a facilitative,
pluralistic one, in which we must be willing to abide by someone
else's unfamiliar or even repellant practice because the same tolerant
impulse protects our own idiosyncracies.
Justice Brennan, Michael H. v. Gerald D.
* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Conference on Democracy and Difference,
Indiana University, April 22-25, 1993; the Annual Meeting of the Law & Society Association, Chicago,
May, 1993; and at Miami University, November 5, 1993. We are grateful to participants in those
events for their helpful comments and for the advice and criticism of Lawrence Douglas and Tom
Dumm.
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[P]rovidence has been pleased to give this one connected country to
one united people-a people descended from the same ancestors,
speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to
the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and
customs.
John Jay, Federalist #2
What happens when people of different origins, speaking different
languages and professing different religions, inhabit the same locality
and live under the same political sovereignty? Ethnic and racial con-
flict-far more than ideological conflict-is the explosive problem of
our times.
Arthur Schlesinger, "The Cult of Ethnicity, Good and Bad,"
Time, July 8, 1991, at 21.
I. INTRODUCTION
In January 1992, People magazine ran a story entitled "Die, My
Daughter, Die!"' describing the murder of sixteen-year-old Tina Isa, the
daughter of Zein and Maria Isa, Palestinians who emigrated with their
seven children to the United States from the West Bank in 1985. Opposite
a half-page photo of Zein in a bloodstained sweater, the People article
explained that he had hoped to arrange a marriage for Tina, as he had for
her three older sisters. He wanted Tina to return to his native village and
marry a relative of one of his sons-in-law. Tina resented and resisted her
father's plans concerning her marriage and defied the strict, traditional
values of her parents by taking a job and dating an African-American
schoolmate.2 As a result, Tina and her father had frequent fights during
which he warned her about her "offensive" behavior (e.g., allowing herself
to be seen in public with her boyfriend) and threatened to vindicate the
family's damaged honor.3 On the night of Tina's death, Zein again
confronted her and accused her of shaming the family by virtue of her
allegedly promiscuous behavior. Then, while Tina's mother held her down,
Zein stabbed Tina to death with a seven-inch knife.
1. Die, My Daughter, Die!, PEOPLE, Jan. 20, 1992, at 71 [hereinafter PEOPLE].
2. Id. at 75. Tina and her brothers and sisters had all been forbidden to go on school trips, to go
to concerts, to visit friends on weekends, or to date. Unlike her siblings, Tina refused to abide by these
prohibitions. In so doing, she apparently violated longstanding Arab understandings concerning
appropriate behavior for young women and, in the eyes of her parents, brought shame and dishonor on
their family name.
3. For an interesting discussion of crimes of honor, see Lamma Abu-Odeh, Honor Crimes and the
Construction of Gender in the Arab World (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Austin Sarat).
See also Michael Humphrey, Community Disputes: Violence and Dispute Processing in a Lebanese
Muslim Immigrant Community, 22 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 53 (1984).
[Vol. 6: 285
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Charged with first-degree murder, the Isas presented a "cultural de-
fense."4 They claimed that they should not be found guilty since what
they did to Tina would not have been treated as a serious crime in their
homeland.5 They maintained that they were obeying the law as they (and
Tina) knew and understood it, and that Tina's disobedience called for her
punishment. The Isas' cultural defense failed, as it generally does,6 and
they were each convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.
At one level, Tina's story is about cultural difference and a clash
between different moral and legal orders. Indeed, the honor code invoked
by Tina's parents is an example of the kind of meaningful cultural commit-
ment frequently romanticized by those who seek to retrieve what they
perceive to be the lost ideals of community and solidarity. But Tina's story
is also an example of difference turned violent. It is a story of what we
will call "disorderly differences"--differences that threaten society's
allegedly fragile harmony and stability. When acted upon, disorderly
differences impose themselves violently and brutally on others. They
forcefully present the question of when and how differences can (and
should) be recognized and accommodated.' Disorderly differences require
us to ask whether we8 can (or should) justify or excuse conduct which,
4. See Note, The Cultural Defense in Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1293 (1986); see also John
C. Lyman, Cultural Defense: Viable Doctrine or Wishful Thinking?, 9 CRIM. JUST. J. 87 (1986); Alison
D. Renteln, Culture and Culpability: A Study of Contrasts, 22 BEVERLY HILLS B. ASs'N J. 17
(1987-88); Julia P. Sams, The Availability of the 'Cultural Defense' as an Excuse for Criminal
Behavior, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 335 (1986); Malek-Mithra Sheybani, Note, Cultural Defense:
One Person's Culture Is Another's Crime, 9 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 751 (1987).
5. PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 75. The article quotes an anthropologist, himself born and raised in
Jerusalem, who said that "the way Tina lived offended her father's sense of honor. 'Everyone growing
up [as Tina had] in the Middle East knows being killed is a possible consequence of dishonoring the
family."' Id.
6. See, e.g., People v. Helen Wu, 235 Cal. App. 3d 614, 634-46 (1991) (discussing the applicability
of a cultural defense to the reasonable person standard of the provocation defense to murder); Eduardo
Trujillo-Garcia v. Rowland, 9 F.3d 1553 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing the application of a reasonable
Mexican male standard to the provocation defense); State v. Aires Correia, 600 A.2d 279, 286-87 (R.I.
1991) (upholding trial judge's decision to exclude psychiatric testimony on cultural acceptance of
violence); People v. Kimura, No. A-091133 (Los Angeles Cty. Super. Ct., Apr. 24, 1985) (addressing
the Japanese cultural practice of parent-child suicide). But see People v. Moua, No. 315972-0 (Fresno
Cty. Super. Ct., Feb. 7, 1985) (mitigation of a sentence for kidnapping based on a recognition of the
Hmong tribal practice of "Zij poj niam" or "marriage-by-capture").
7. Even by framing the question as one of accommodating difference, we have presupposed a
hierarchical legal structure with the authority to annihilate or accommodate difference. Any attempt
to address the problem of difference within a legal framework must inevitably establish some
hierarchical authority for the resolution of conflicts. For an important discussion of the challenge of
recognizing and accommodating difference through the law, see MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990), and Martha Minow, Partial Justice:
Law and Minorities, in THE FATE OF LAW 15 (Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns eds.,1991).
8. By invoking the first person plural pronoun, we have identified ourselves, as judges do in their
opinions, with the interests of a society that has the right and the responsibility to decide whether or
not to recognize or accommodate differences. While such an identification often represents an
"'arrogance of power' behind the patronizing usurpation of the right to speak for the 'free' people of
the world, when they have never been asked," we intend it rather as an invitation to disagree. See
Herbert Spiegelman, On the Right to Say "WE": A Linguistic and Phenomenological Analysis, in
PHENOMENOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY 129, 130 (George Psathas ed., 1973).
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while seemingly reprehensible to us, reflects another person's deeply felt
cultural or religious conviction.
As the story of Tina Isa suggests, contemporary dialogue about identity
and difference grows more complicated as new groups enter our national
life.9 Everywhere, it seems that the more difference is recognized, the
more vexing the effort to accommodate difference in our institutional lives
and practices becomes. Difference frequently appears to be the fearsome
presence within democratic culture, rather than its enlivening wellspring.
Difference, as the epigraphs from John Jay and Arthur Schlesinger suggest,
is a source of dread: a fear of the unknown, an "apprehension of a future
heavy with the possibility of danger."'
To understand difference, one must take the dread which it inspires
seriously. One must recognize that disorder is the often-unspoken specter
that haunts all discussion of difference. As Kenneth Karst puts it, "In all
times and places, cultural differences have bred suspicion and fear ...
[Thus] behind the bland terms 'intercultural relations' lies the menace of
violence."" Each claim for exemption or special recognition is seen as
implying others, in a multiplying and unlimitable progression.' 2 It is as
if every demand for recognition and accommodation raises the question: If
this, then what? Or as Alison Renteln says of criminal law: "Anarchy
would reign if each person could claim a different cultural immunity from
prosecution.' ' 13  While such questions and statements sometimes are an
indication of bad faith, 14 they also reflect the reasonable belief that the
proliferating recognition of difference might itself generate an accelerating
and potentially destabilizing realignment of institutional practices.15
Those who reject calls for such a realignment by equating difference
with disorder can be condemned as naive, intolerant, or just fearful of
losing the privileges to which they have grown accustomed. Though such
condemnations may sometimes be appropriate, they do little to advance the
9. See BARBARA JOHNSON, A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE (1987).
10. Gretchen Craft, Note, The Persistence of Dread in Law and Literature, 102 YALE L.J. 521,521
(1992).
11. Kenneth Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV.
305, 310-11 (1986).
12. See U.S. v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1008-09 (1969). See also David Steinberg, Religious
Exemptions as Affirmative Action, 40 EMORY L.J. 77 (1991).
13. Renteln, supra note 4, at 26.
14. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Bad Company, 56 TRANSITION 60 (1992) (critiquing ARTHUR
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY
(1992)). For Schlesinger, the "great unifying Western ideas of individual freedom, political democracy,
and human rights," SCHLESINGER, DISUNITING OF AMERICA, at 138, define a unique American
nationality and are opposed to the "cultures based on despotism, superstition, tribalism, and fanaticism,"
id. at 128, which exist in non-European (African) civilization.
15. For example, see Patricia Williams's evocation of the proliferation of rights. "Unlock them,"
Williams urges, "from reification by giving them to slaves. Give them to trees. Give them to cows.
Give them to history. Give them to rivers and rocks. Give to all of society's objects and untouchables
the rights of privacy, integrity, and self-assertion ...." PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE
AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR 165 (1991).
[Vol. 6: 285
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claims of difference or to increase the likelihood of a politically progressive
response to, and accommodation of, those claims. Disorder, as the
quotations from Jay and Schlesinger suggest, is an imagined twin of
difference; thus, a productive response to the dilemmas of difference must
confront the problem of order and disorder.16  Those who champion
difference and seek to make it an energizing presence in American society
must learn to constitute difference in a way that controls disorder even as
it celebrates the multiple, contradictory affiliations and identities that give
our lives meaning. 17
Our broad claim in this Article is that friends of difference must learn to
think and speak about order-indeed, to recognize order as the indispens-
able partner of difference itself. What is required is not only a more
accommodating understanding of difference, but also an enhanced
vocabulary for speaking about order. All too often, the friends of
difference refuse to speak of order; in so doing, we leave the field to
16. In addition to the perceived disorderliness of difference, a second explanation for the dread
associated with difference is that difference is often understood as a threat to individual and collective
identities. The myth of stable identities-in which one's identity is one's own rather than differentially
defined against others-requires that there be others who are excluded from the "We" or the "I."
"[T]he maintenance of one identity ... involves the conversion of some differences into otherness, into
evil, or one of its numerous surrogates. Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts
difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty." WILLIAM CONNOLLY,
IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC NEGOTIATIONS OF POLITICAL PARADOX 64 (1991). As William
Connolly argues, difference usually fosters a reaction that seeks to protect the stability of an "Us" or
an "I" by converting some differences into an evil othemess. As a result, Connolly argues that "any
ordered way of life [is probably unable] to house together in one harmonious whole all the identities
that might otherwise make a claim upon it. No order can enable everything to flower in the same
garden: this is a 'necessary injustice.' . . ." Id. at 159-60. If Connolly is right in his belief that the
imagined threat of difference is its challenge to stable and coherent identities rather than to order, then
our attempt to show that difference can be consistent with order would not fully tame the threat of
difference in American culture and law. Nevertheless, we believe that making difference compatible
with order remains a necessary and viable first step in the effort to take difference seriously.
17. See Pauline V. Rosenau & Harry Bredemeier, Modem and Postmodern Conceptions of Social
Order, 60 SOC. RES. 337, 341, 359-60 (1993). As Dennis Wrong argues, "The 'problem of order' has
come to be widely recognized as... the major, perennial issue of social theory." DENNIS WRONG, THE
PROBLEM OF ORDER: WHAT UNITES AND DIVIDES SOCIETY 37 (1994).
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others. 18 As a result, the potential for orderly difference remains unreal-
ized.
In Part II, we argue that, in American law, difference is rhetorically
imagined as an invitation to disorder or, alternatively, difference is made
to disappear in the name of reassuring orderliness. This should not be
surprising given that law always speaks in the name of order and seeks to
"impose an artificial order on chaotic reality."' 9  Only those differences
that pose no threat to order, or whose threats can be assimilated in a
narrative of predictable change-that is, only those differences that have
been sufficiently domesticated to fit within prevailing cultural assumptions
and institutional routines-are recognized and accommodated.
We develop our argument in Part II through a reading, informed by
Tzvetan Todorov's Conquest of America,20  of two Supreme Court
cases-Reynolds v. United States2' and Wisconsin v. Yoder.22  Separated
by almost a century, Reynolds and Yoder both involve claims of distinct
religious groups to exemption from the demands of the law of the state.
In Reynolds, the claim was rejected; in Yoder, it was accepted. In the
former, difference was made disorderly in such a way as to demand
rejection; in the latter, difference was domesticated and made to disappear.
In Part III, we argue that Reynolds and Yoder exemplify the poverty of
the prevailing vocabularies of order and difference provided by liberalism,
with its focus on individualism and tolerance, and by civic republicanism,
with its focus on community and virtue. If we are ever to "discover the
other" and embrace Todorov's vision of different but equal,23 we must
find a vocabulary that welcomes difference while acknowledging claims for
18. Academic reaction to the violence following the first Rodney King verdict rightly countered
the media's demonization of the Black, Hispanic, and Latino communities living in South Central Los
Angeles. See READING RODNEY KING/READING URBAN UPRISING (Robert Gooding-Williams ed.,
1993). But academics generally refused to speak about order. Instead, it was the local community and
religious organizations who angrily resented the riots and who stressed the need to bring order to the
area.
Here, the dialogue about difference in democratic culture might take a lesson from what is called "left
realism" in criminology. See Jock Young, The Failure of Criminology: The Need for a Radical
Realism, in CONFRONTING CRIME 4 (Roger Matthews and Jock Young eds., 1986). Left realism in
criminology emerged as a response to the utopian idealism of radical criminology in the 1960s and
1970s, which criticized those who made "too much" of the problem of crime and advocated
decarceration and eventually the abolition of prisons. See STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS OF SOCIAL
CONTROL: CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND CLASSIFICATION (1985); Stanley Cohen, Intellectual Skepticism
and Political Commitment: The Case of Radical Criminology, 13 STUD. L. POL. & SOC'Y 187 (1993).
The left realist maintained that progressive scholars had to take seriously the demand for order and
carefully assess the costs of rearranging social institutions. It was necessary, in other words, to put the
problem of order on the agenda of those who sought to alter and reform the practices of the criminal
justice system.
19. Craft, supra note 10, at 536.
20. TZVETAN TODOROV, THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA: THE QUESTION OF THE OTHER (Richard
Howard trans., 1985).
21. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
22. 406 U.S. 205 (1971).
23. For a critique of this notion, see CONNOLLY, supra note 16, at 45-48.
[Vol. 6: 285
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order. Neither liberal tolerance nor civic republican virtue meet that
challenge. As a result, American law obliterates difference in the name of
order, or treats orderly difference as no difference at all.
In Part IV, we argue that at a time when the notion of stable identities
is exposed in popular culture and the academy as illusory and when the
search for solidarity is revealed in its genocidal potential, the simple
formula of either annihilating or assimilating difference must be transcend-
ed. In short, our vocabulary for speaking about and structuring difference
must be changed. We see in scholarship on legal pluralism one resource
for making that change, in part because legal pluralism provides communi-
ties with a set of principles that can be used to decide which claims of
difference to honor and which demands for order to respect.
II. THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF DIFFERENCE
A. Reynolds v. United States: Imagining the Savage
Over one hundred years ago, the United States Supreme Court confronted
what might now be called a cultural defense claim in a case involving an
admitted violation of a law against polygamy by a member of the Mormon
Church.24 The defendant, George Reynolds, claimed that he should not
be convicted of the offense because the Utah statute conflicted with his
religious beliefs and practices. Reynolds maintained that it "'was the duty
of male members of ... [the Mormon Church], circumstances permitting,
to practice polygamy ... [and] that he had received permission from the
recognized authorities in said church to enter into polygamous
marriage.'''25 It is important to note, as the Court did not, that Reynolds's
request for an exemption from the statute prohibiting polygamy employed
not the language of freedom or willfulness, but the language of "duty' and
"authority." In other words, Reynolds's claim for the recognition of
difference was expressed as an acknowledgement of the need for order.
Even as he asserted the limits of the sovereign prerogative of the state,
Reynolds claimed not to be free, but to be bound by a different law.
As the Court described Reynolds's position, however, his deference to
"duty" and "authority" disappeared. The question before the Court as
framed by Chief Justice Waite was whether one could be found guilty of
violating a properly enacted law "if he entertains a religious belief that the
law is wrong. 26  This artful alteration of Reynolds's original claim
framed Reynolds's difference as a threat to state law itself. 27 Reynolds,
24. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145.
25. Id. at 161.
26. Id. at 162.
27. On the importance of the way questions are framed in judicial opinions, see Robert A.
Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as a Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201 (1990).
1994]
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in fact, advanced no view as to whether the law against polygamy was right
or wrong outside the Mormon community. Rather, he argued that he
should be exempt from the law's reach because of the unresolvable conflict
between his civic and religious obligations.
In response, Waite quoted Thomas Jefferson for the proposition that a
citizen "has no natural right in opposition to his social duties. 28
Reynolds, of course, had raised the thorny question of what those social
duties were and who could legitimately require him to perform them. He
argued that in the case of religious marriage, the state's claimed authority
was too expansive and intrusive. But Waite did not take up the challenge
as posed. Instead, the Chief Justice merely noted that polygamous marriage
was prohibited throughout American society and that while Reynolds was
free to believe whatever his conscience dictated about the morality of
polygamy, he was not free to turn that belief into action. The First
Amendment, Waite argued, deprived Congress of "all legislative power
over mere opinion, but ... left [Congress] free to reach actions which were
in violation of social duties or subversive of good order. '29  But was
Reynolds really a subversive? Was he really a radical proponent of the
view that each person should be free to decide on the nature and limits of
his social duties? Or was he instead so committed to his religious duties
that he was prepared to defy what social theorists today might call a
"colonial" legal order.3°
Waite's treatment of Reynolds's argument provides a powerful example
of what Mark Tushnet calls the "reduction principle ' 3' and of the Supreme
28. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
29. Id. See also Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal
Development, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381 (1967); Note, Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion: A
Subjective Approach, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1258 (1989).
30. For a valuable discussion of the nature of colonial legal orders see Sally E. Merry, Law and
Colonialism, 25 L. & Soc'Y REV. 889 (1991).
31. Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701 (1986). See also David
Williams & Susan Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (1991).
The origins of the "reduction principle" can be found in John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration,
in JOHN LOCKE, TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 167
(Charles L. Sherman ed., Appleton-Century 1937) (1689). There Locke's argument for the toleration
of religious difference reduced religious beliefs into subjective opinions to be confined to the private
sphere. Id. at 171-75. Such a move could not be made except by changing the terms of debate in
which religious differences are held to be insurmountable. Locke restructures the dilemma of difference
by transforming the meaning and significance of difference from the public and objective spheres to
the private and subjective. Kirstie McClure refers to Locke's semantic move as the distinction between
difference and diversity. Kirstie McClure, The Limits of Toleration, 18 POL. THEORY 361, 376 (1990).
As McClure observes, to "difference" something is to construct a "hierarchical relation between
things, but a hierarchy that... will be persuasive only to such others as concur with the principle of
difference deployed in the particular case." Id. at 373. But, from the perspective of the religious
believer, the difference religion makes can often be the difference between corruption and salvation,
disgrace and honor, and righteousness and repugnance. The difference of religion is not simply the
difference of opinion, but rather, a belief rooted in a communal ideal through which an individual
transcends that individuality and becomes part of a shared faith. See Emile Durkheim, Elementary
Forms of Religious Life, in ON MORALITY AND SOCIETY 187 (Robert N. Bellah ed., 1973). "A
philosophy may well be elaborated in the silence of the interior imagination, but not so a faith. For
[Vol. 6: 285
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Court's tendency to convert questions of difference into questions of order.
In Tushnet's view, the Court has, throughout its history, treated religion as
a private and solitary act of individual conscience, as a belief, like any
other belief, with no greater or lesser right to inform civic practices. As a
result, claims of religious difference are just another expression of the kind
of idiosyncratic preferences which a liberal society generates and supports.
"It matters not," Waite wrote, "that his [Reynolds's] belief was part of his
professed religion; it was still belief and belief only.",32  In other words,
people are free to believe whatever they want, but they are not free to act
on even their most sincerely held religious beliefs.33 All differences are,
in the end, merely differences of opinion. To imagine that religious belief
could be the basis for selective exemptions from the obligations of state
law would, again in Waite's words, be "subversive of good order.
' 34
Here Waite provides a traditional liberal response to religious difference.
After defining questions of religious truth as questions of subjective belief
that are properly confined to private lives, liberals, like John Locke in A
Letter Concerning Toleration, construct the civic realm as the place where
"[p]articular matters of fact are the undoubted foundations on which our
civil and natural knowledge is built. ' 35 Kirstie McClure describes Locke's
move as "a way of converting sectarian 'differences' in religious matters
into 'diversity,' by constituting a realm of civil facticity to dissolve those
before all else, a faith is warmth, life, enthusiasm, the exaltation of the whole mental life, the raising
of the individual above himself." Id. at 198. For a contrary view, see Thomas Jefferson, as quoted in
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 ("Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man
and his God ....").
32. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167.
33. See Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REv. 753
(1984). See also Paul Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards Under the Free Exercise
Clause, 1973 DuKE L.J. 1217.
34. A recent example of this argument is found in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990). In that case, two members of the Native American Church were fired from their jobs for
smoking peyote in violation of Oregon law and were consequently deemed ineligible for unemployment
insurance. In response to their claim that they were smoking peyote at a religious ceremony in
accordance with their religion, Justice Scalia's majority opinion held: "Precisely because 'we are a
cosmopolitan nation made up of a people of almost every conceivable religious preference' we cannot
afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation
of conduct ...." that impinges on his religious beliefs. Id. at 888. In addition, Scalia quoted from
Waite's opinion in Reynolds: "To permit this [exemption from law] would be to make the professed
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself." Id. at 879. Any society doing so would be, in Scalia's words, "courting
anarchy." Id. at 888.
35. McClure, supra note 31, at 375 (citing Locke). The care of the soul, as the quintessential
private and subjective entity, is not a factual or outward force that can or ought to be subject to civil
authority. As Locke writes,
Now that the whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only to these civil concernments, and
that all civil power, right and dominion, is bounded and confined to the only care of promoting
these things; and that it neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to the salvation of
souls.... [Tlhe care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his power consists
only in outward force ....
LOCKE, supra note 31, at 172-73.
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hierarchical and intrinsically relational conscientious 'differences' of
religious practice into equivalent and independent ... religious communi-
ties."36 Put differently, both Locke and Waite align civil authority with
fact and religious diversity with a fictional subjectivity.
Waite's concern for order and his desire to assert civil power, limited
only by respect for conscience, set the stage for the Court's transformation
of religious difference into a threatening diversity. Properly religious
questions are those that concern salvation and do not threaten the civil
interests-life, liberty, and property-of others. As soon as one's actions
cross the line from the religious into the civil-i.e., as soon as one's actions
are seen to harm another-they are subject to civil jurisdiction. "The rule
of toleration that results is thus constructed not on the principle of
conscience but on the absence of worldly injury . . . ,,3' The vocabulary
of liberal toleration transforms freedom to live one's life in accordance with
the laws of one's religion into a limited freedom of worship as permitted
by a civil law regime.
As a result, in Reynolds religious difference becomes a disorderly
difference pressing its claims against social duty and state order. This is,
in fact, the way Waite rhetorically constituted the Mormon practice of
polygamy; his figures and allusions represent polygamy as both a savage
practice and the practice of savages. Resistance to polygamy was,
therefore, the mark of a civilizing progress. "Polygamy," Waite confidently
noted, "has always been odious among the northern and western nations of
Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost
36. McClure, supra note 31, at 376.
37. Id. at 380. The construction of harm is necessarily culturally relative. The Isas, for example,
claim that Tina harmed their honor as well as herself by forsaking her religion and culture. In the case
of Mormon polygamy, it is not Mormon women who are claiming a harm, but the U.S. government;
from the perspective of the Mormons, it is the restriction of polygamy and not polygamy itself that
represents a harm. We may all agree that harms to others are to be avoided, but our political battles
are fought at the level of what exactly constitutes a harm. Id. at 383.
Locke's separation of religious and civic realms defined by the absence or presence of worldly harm
is extended, by John Stuart Mill, to a more generalized separation of individual and social realms. Mill
writes:
To individuality should belong the part of life in which it is chiefly the individual that is
interested; to society, the part which chiefly interests society. ... As soon as any part of a
person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and
the question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it
becomes open to discussion.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 141 (Penguin Books 1987) (1859). But Mill's extension of the harm
principle is problematic precisely because it, as did Locke's, begs the question of what constitutes a
harm.
The relativity of the harm principle makes it difficult if not impossible for Locke and Mill to extend
the concept of toleration to more generalized issues of difference. Locke's formulation only works
when there is a consensus on the line demarcating public and private concerns. But it is precisely that
line which has been successfully and repeatedly challenged. As the division of political and private is
dissolved and issues that used to be considered private-from religious claims for rights to women's
claims for protection from their spouses-become public, we are seeing the limitations of the theory
of tolerance for dealing with issues of difference.
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exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people., 38 As
Waite understood it, that savage practice posed a grave threat to the
institution of marriage, which was also viewed through the lens of order.
Marriage was the basis on which "society may be said to be built."39 To
honor Reynolds's request for an exemption would be to threaten society
and civilization itself.
This exemption would, on Waite's account, lead immediately onto a
slippery slope, in which savagery would find its place in the midst of
civilization. The Mormons now stand in for African-Americans who,
though free, cannot, in Tocqueville's words, be made "otherwise than an
alien to the European. Nor is this all; we scarcely acknowledge the
common features of humanity in this stranger.. . amongst us."'  The job
of law, then, would be to counter the dread conjured up by disorderly
difference-first by marking the stranger and then by civilizing or at least
taming him through repression of his savage difference. To condone that
difference, to welcome the stranger, would be an invitation to an escalating
danger.
Waite evokes the slippery slope by posing two rhetorical questions.
"Suppose," Waite asked,
one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious
worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government
under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if
a wife religiously believed it was her duty to bum herself upon the
funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the
civil government to prevent her from carrying that belief into
practice?
41
Through these questions, Waite again frames the question of difference as
a question of civilization versus savagery. The polygamous Mormons
move from wanting to marry many women to wanting to sacrifice them in
religious rituals or to tolerating ritual suicide by the grieving widows. The
tranquil voice of duty and authority with which Reynolds framed his
request for exemption is translated into a series of imagined horrors.
Here the law's harsh rebuke of the duty-invoking, authority-obeying
Reynolds becomes comprehensible as a semiotics of colonialism itself.
Law's passion for order and for imposing itself against disorderly
differences is a passion for "civilization" against a brutal, lawless
38. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
39. Id. at 165.
40. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 459 (Henry Reeve trans., 6th ed. 1876)
(1835).
41. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
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"savagery. '12 Because "we" would not sanction human sacrifice or wife
burning, we should not sanction polygamy. To sanction the latter is to
invite, in an axiomatic fashion, the former.
As Peter Fitzpatrick has observed in another context, "law and order...
[are] constantly combined not just in opposition to but as a means of
subduing the 'disordered and riotous' savages in their state of lawless
'anarchy'. . [T]his scenario precisely reverses what was the case."43
In other words, the Mormons in Reynolds need to be portrayed as what
they are not-disorderly savages-and contrasted with what "we" imagine
ourselves to be-purveyors of a unitary order. This double mythology,
which denies order to difference and denies that law itself is a source of
disorder, is necessary to maintain the coherent national and legal identities
Waite imagines to be threatened by Reynolds's claim. As Fitzpatrick has
so usefully reminded us, the history of western law is the history of a
rhetorical inversion, in which the law of colonial states regularly disrupts
the order of various subcultures and, at the same time, labels itself the
champion of order. For law to pull off this trick the "sources of disorder
must exist outside of law-in the eruptions and disruptions of untamed
nature or barely contained human passion against which an ordering law is
intrinsically set." 44  Disorderly differences, especially the differences
associated with religious, racial, or linguistic variation, serve this rhetorical
purpose quite well.
Implicit in Reynolds's claim, as understood by Waite, was the prospect
of escalating disorder. Reynolds must be asked to sacrifice his religious
practice to prevent the sacrifice of (ordered) life in the name of religion.
Religion that sanctions polygamy is imagined to exert such a powerful,
mysterious, and ultimately irrational pull that, once it is let loose in the
world, it challenges government itself. "To permit ... [a man to excuse
his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief] would be to
make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the
land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto him-
self., 45 To recognize and honor the difference Reynolds asserted was to
42. It is also a way of reaffirming "our" own sense of identity. As William Connolly puts it,
The definition of difference is a requirement built into the logic of identity, and the construction
of otherness is a temptation that readily insinuates itself into that logic-and more than a
temptation: a temptation because it is constantly at work and because there may be political ways
to fend it off or to reduce its power; more than a temptation because it typically moves below the
threshold of conscious reflection and because every attempt to come to terms with it encounters
stubborn obstacles built into the logic of identity and the structural imperatives of social
organization.
CONNOLLY, supra note 16, at 9.
43. PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW 80 (1992).
44. Id. at 81.
45. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167.
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take the plunge into the abyss of anarchy, to insure that "government could
exist only in name. 46
Again Waite reads Reynolds's claim through the lens of order and in the
guise of a radically individualist version of liberal political thought in
which each person's preferences assert sovereignty, unless checked by a
neutral state. It made no difference to Waite that this was not the claim
that Reynolds actually made, or that Reynolds approached the court as a
member of a community that itself asserted the right to govern his
conduct.47 In fact, Reynolds did not claim the right to "become a law
unto himself." Instead his request for exemption from the reach of state
law was based on a recognition of another kind of obligation, a different
sphere of obedience rather than licentious freedom.
The difference Reynolds pressed was disorderly not because it was either
anarchic or savage. It was disorderly precisely because it challenged a
prevailing institutional practice-monogamous marriage-and because it
did not reflect an idiosyncratic belief, but rather the "legitimate" practice
of an entire subculture. 48 Rejecting polygamy was not a rejection of
disorder, but was instead the violent gesture of one legal order against
another.4 9 Waite's resistance to polygamy-his identification of difference
with disorder-was, and remains, typical of the response of law that marks
the different as strange and renders the strange a dangerous, disordering
presence in our midst. For law to welcome difference it must code that
difference in a way that tames its disordering potential and reassures itself
and its audience that difference is not dangerous. Coming to terms with the
problem of order is thus a legal prerequisite to the recognition and
accommodation of difference.
B. Wisconsin v. Yoder: When Difference Is No Difference at All
An important contrast to Waite's judgment and rhetorical strategy in
Reynolds is provided by Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in
Wisconsin v. Yoder.50 Although Burger's opinion accommodates Yoder's
claim for difference, his opinion so completely co-opts the difference
claimed by the Amish that, as Burger presents the case, the Amish are not
different at all. Burger's denial of the Amish's difference allows him to
accommodate their claim, but in so doing he does not resolve the question
of how difference can coexist with order.
46. Id.
47. See Developments in Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1703 (1987).
48. For a more recent expression of Waite's rejection of subcultural differences, see Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
49. See FITZPATRICK, supra note 43, at 80.
50. 406 U.S. 205 (1971).
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Decided in 1971, Yoder also included a request for exemption by a
religious group, and again the request dealt with an important social
institution-public education. Members of the Old Order Amish challenged
a Wisconsin law that required them to send their children to a certified
public or private school until they reached the age of 16. The Amish
refused to send their children to a state-sanctioned school after the eighth
grade, so that most Amish children were removed from school by the age
of fourteen. As a result, Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy
were convicted of violating the Wisconsin compulsory-attendance law.
The Amish argued that the law infringed upon their rights under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. Echoing George Reynolds, they said that
compliance with the state statute would require them to disobey the
commands of their church and also "endanger their own salvation and that
of the children."'51 They noted that their religion required "life in a church
community separate and apart from the world and worldly influence.
'" 52
In addition, high school and higher education were objectionable "because
the values they [public schools] teach are in marked variance with Amish
values and the Amish way of life; they [the Amish] view[ed] secondary
school as an impermissible exposure of their children to a 'worldly'
influence in conflict with their beliefs. 53
Yoder is one of the relatively few cases in the American constitutional
tradition in which a court granted a request for exemption from a valid
law.54 Yet in Burger's rhetorical figuration, difference is neither recog-
nized nor accommodated; instead, Burger makes difference disappear. He
overcomes the problem of disorder by portraying the Amish, through an
image of sameness, as exemplars of fundamental American values and, in
their timeless simplicity, as the true embodiment of a threatened, precious
way of life.55 Through a not coincidental intertextual inversion, Burger
51. Id. at209.
52. Id. at 210. See Timothy Hall, Religion and Civic Virtue, 67 TUL. L. REV. 87 (1992).
53. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 211. For a discussion of the nature of the claim made in Yoder, see
Williams & Williams, supra note 31, at 883-88.
54. Others include People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (exemption for use of peyote in an
Indian religious ritual); Frank v. Alaska, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979) (exemption from a hunting
regulation for an Indian tribe); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1962) (upholding claim for
unemployment compensation by Seventh Day Adventists who refused to work on the Sabbath); Thomas
v. Indiana Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1980) (upholding claim to unemployment benefits by a
Jehovah's Witness). See Philip Hamburger, A Constitutional Right to Religious Exemption: An
Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992); Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free
Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350 (1980).
55. See Philip Kurland, The Religion Clauses and the Burger Court, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 16-17
(1984). The construction of difference as sameness is called a "boomerang perception" by Elizabeth
V. Spelmai in her book Inessential Woman. Spelman cites the line, "I have assumed that slaves were
merely ordinary human beings, that innately Negroes are, after all, only white men with black skins,
nothing more, nothing less," from Kenneth Stampp's book on U.S. slavery. ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN,
INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT 12 (1988) (quoting KENNETH
STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH vii-viii (1956)). As
Spelman argues, the boomerang perception which enables us to look at you, but sees only ourselves,
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appeals to Thomas Jefferson to turn the Amish from unrecognizable
strangers into icons of Americana, just as Waite used Jefferson in Reynolds
to dramatize the threat of Mormon polygamy. "IT]he Amish communities,"
Burger contends, "singularly parallel and reflect many of the virtues of
Jefferson's ideal of the 'sturdy yeoman' who would form the basis of what
he considered as the ideal of democratic society."56 Unlike Waite's
rendering of the Mormons as the savage other, Burger situates the Amish
as an established part of "us"-representatives of a vanishing, but still
recognizable, American landscape.
By the time Burger is done describing the Amish, their difference is
assimilated and therefore denied. In this gesture, Burger does the kind of
linguistic violence that Todorov attributes to Christian missionaries who
rationalized the colonial ambitions of the Spanish conquest of the Aztecs.
Todorov argues that such violence is done by asserting identities and
equivalencies as a way of justifying allegedly humane treatment. He
presents Las Casas's description of the Aztecs as a characteristic act of
erasure in which the other is recognized only in and through an asserted
essential identity. "According to Las Casas," Todorov writes,
the Indians' most characteristic feature is their resemblance to
Christians .... The Indians are provided with Christian virtues, they
are obedient and peaceful. . . . 'These people, considered in general,
are by their nature all gentleness, humility and poverty, without
weapons or defenses nor the least ingenuity, patient and enduring as
none other in the world.' . . . Here then is an incontestable generosity
on the part of Las Casas who refuses to despise others simply because
they are different. But he goes one step further and adds: moreover,
they are not ... different.57
Burger's violence, like that of Las Casas, turns an asserted difference into
a comforting and recognizable similarity. What appears initially strange
is really, on second glance, quite familiar. What appears outside is already
inside. What appears a challenging other is really a nostalgia-inducing
remnant of a past we have regrettably left behind. In contrast to Waite's
Mormons who were presented as anarchic and thus savage, Burger's
Amish, like Las Casas's Aztecs, are obedient, patient, and peaceful, and
thus good Americans and Christians.
Burger's opinion is replete with various reassuring gestures that take on
meaning when contrasted with Waite's opinion in Reynolds. The first of
these gestures is the suggestion that the Amish claim of difference does not
pose a challenge to the system of compulsory education itself. Whereas the
provides a model, not for recognizing difference but rather for perpetuating ethnocentrism.
56. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 225-26.
57. TODOROV, supra note 20, at 163-67.
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practices of the polygamous Mormons were portrayed as incompatible with
the institution of marriage, Burger notes that "[t]he Amish do not object to
elementary education through the first eight grades as a general proposition
because they agree that their children must have basic skills in the 'three
R's..... They view such a basic education as acceptable because it does
not expose their children to worldly values. . . . Burger insists that
there is less difference in the Amish claim than would initially seem to be
the case as he repeatedly notes that they already embrace the very values
which the state seeks to promote through compulsory education.59
The reference to worldly values in the language quoted above is one of
many in Burger's opinion; the Amish, Burger notes, view secondary
education as an "impermissible exposure of their children to a 'worldly'
influence in conflict with their beliefs." Moreover, they seek "separation
from, rather than integration with, contemporary worldly society." 6
Throughout Burger's opinion, the Amish are portrayed as innocents
opposed to a modem worldliness about which Burger himself is, at best,
quite ambivalent. Amish devotion to "life, family and home" (Ronald
Reagan would have said "work, faith, and family"), Burger argues, "have
remained constant" against the pressures of modernity.6' Burger unabash-
edly sentimentalizes Amish existence, describing their life as "inherently
simple and uncomplicated, 62 and praising their "qualities of reliability,
self-reliance and dedication to work. 63
Writing at the beginning of the 1970s, Burger embraces the Amish as a
living rebuke to the leftish, "hippie" values that had predominated in the
previous decade. As Todorov describes the hippies:
The ... hippies of the sixties, in their refusal to adopt the [Jeffer-
sonian] ideal of their country ... tried to rediscover the life of the
noble savage. A little like the Indians .... they tried to do without
money, to forget books and writing, to show indifference to clothes
and renounce the use of machines-to do their own thing. But such
58. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 212.
59. Burger argues that the Amish "have carried the ... difficult burden of demonstrating the
adequacy of their alternative mode of continuing informal vocational education in terms of precisely
those overall interests that the State advances in support of its program of compulsory high school
education." Id. at 235. Justice Blackmun in his dissent in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 907 (1990), makes a similar claim. There he reminds us that
the values and interests of those seeking a religious exemption in this case are congruent, to a
great degree, with those the state seeks to promote.... [T]he Church's doctrine ... advocates
self-reliance, familial responsibility, and abstinence from alcohol.... Far from promoting the
lawless and irresponsible use of drugs, Native American Church members' spiritual code
exemplifies values that Oregon's drug laws are presumably intended to favor.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 915-16.
60. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 211.
61. Id.
62. id. at 217.
63. Id. at 224.
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communities were obviously doomed to failure, since they pasted
these 'primitive' features on an altogether modern individualist
mentality.'
Paradoxically, then, the hippies become mediating tropes in connecting
Waite's vision of the Mormons to Burger's image of the Amish, even as
the latter turns the Amish into examples of the sort of people Marilyn
Quayle would evoke two decades later as those who, during the sixties,
neither did drugs nor evaded the draft. Thus Burger needs both to praise
the Amish for their difference and, at the same time, to deny them their
difference. As he puts it, "Even their idiosyncratic separateness exemplifies
the diversity we profess to admire and encourage. '65 The problem of
disorder is overcome because it, like the difference with which it is
associated, is dissolved into a nostalgic identity.
The Amish, Burger writes, live a "life of 'goodness,' rather than a life
of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical knowledge; community welfare
rather than competition." 66 Given this goodness, wisdom, and community,
refusing to respond to the Amish desire for what Burger sees as a slight
accommodation 67 would be a self-destructive act by one part of ourselves
against another. As Todorov suggests, "At the same time it was tending
to obliterate the strangeness of the external other, Western civilization
found an interior other.... We no longer believe in wild men in the
forests, but we have discovered the beast in man ....68
Burger explicitly rejects Waite's aggressively colonialist response to
difference even as he enacts a subtler version of the same thing. Instead
of holding out the claim of difference as a mark of an irreducible otherness,
he marks the difference which he confronts as a useful reminder of what
America once (in his view) was, and might profitably become again. Thus
Burger notes, "we must not forget that in the Middle Ages important values
of the civilization of the Western World were preserved by members of
religious orders who isolated themselves from all worldly influences against
great obstacles." 69 Waite's equation of difference with the uncivilized
other is reversed; in Yoder the other stands in for civilization itself, for "our
values" needing a place of refuge from the dark ages of our own self-made
and corrupt modernity.
64. TODOROV, supra note 20, at 251.
65. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 226.
66. Id. at 211.
67. Burger notes that there is a "minimal difference between what the State would require and what
the Amish already accept .... " Id. at 236.
68. TODOROV, supra note 20, 248-49.
69. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 223.
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Indeed much of Burger's opinion can be understood as a "ceremony of
regret, ' 70 a lamentation over the conditions of a modernity gone bad.
Throughout, he refers to the Amish in terms of their longevity and their
stability, and he praises the religious beliefs which "they and their forebears
have adhered to for almost three centuries."'7  These beliefs are juxta-
posed with the "values and programs of the modern secondary school.,
72
"It cannot be overemphasized," Burger writes, "that we are not dealing with
a way of life and mode of education by a group claiming to have recently
discovered some 'progressive' or more enlightened process for rearing
children in modem life. 73  The Amish represent a timeless difference
marked by its endurance over time and its need for defense against a
transient version of progress.
Moreover, unlike Waite who figured difference as a threat to the state,
Burger notes that no such threat is posed in this case. The Amish are
docile, weak, and powerless in the face of the state. "There is no doubt,"
Burger confidently claims, "as to the power of a State ... to impose
reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education. 74
It is significant that Burger uses the term power rather than authority.
What Burger wants to say is that the difference which the Amish allegedly
represent is neither so disorderly a difference nor so potent a difference as
to represent a threat to order itself.
75
In fact, in what initially seem like extraneous passages, Burger states first
in one place that the Amish "have an excellent record as law-abiding...
members of society, ' 76 and then in another that "its members are
productive ... members of society ... [who] reject public welfare in any
of its usual modem forms., 77 Their law-abidingness is again a powerful
imagistic rejection of the riotous, rebellious violence of the sixties. Unlike
the dope-smoking, draft-card-burning students of the 1960s, Amish youth,
in Burger's account, capably fulfill the "social and political responsibilities
of citizenship.,
78
But Burger's images and allusions reach further back than the immedi-
ately preceding decade. Burger conjures the image of Henry David
Thoreau to mark the contrast between the Amish way of life and those
who, as modern-day Thoreaus, would self-indulgently and self-righteously
70. See David Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an
American Community, 18 L. & Soc'y REv. 551, 580 (1984).
71. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
72. Id. at 217.
73. Id. at 235.
74. Id. at 213.
75. See Tushnet, supra note 31. Tushnet suggests that an alternate explanation for the
accommodation of the Amish's claim is its marginality and impotence.
76. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213.
77. Id. at 222.
78. Id. at 225.
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put themselves above the law. While Thoreau "rejected the social values
of his time," the Amish, Burger notes, do not want to allow "every person
to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a
whole has important interests. 79  Unlike Waite, who understands
differences as matters of personal preference, Burger differentiates "deep
religious conviction" in a community in which "religion pervades and
determines virtually their entire way of life, regulating it with the detail of
the Talmudic diet through the strictly enforced rules of the church
community,' 8° from what he calls mere "personal preference. The
Amish are, in Burger's eyes, doubly regulated by a regime of state law to
which they almost religiously adhere just as they adhere to the "strictly
enforced rules" of their religion. The disorderliness of difference is tamed;
difference is subject to an ordering regime of disciplining regulation.
In Yoder, the distinction between members and strangers which so
vividly marked Waite's construction of the disorderliness of difference
dissolves into sameness and identity. The Amish are already reassuringly
orderly members. Their law-abidingness, while of little technical or formal
relevance in a First Amendment case, marks their "difference" as orderly
in its commitment to, and respect for, a law beyond themselves.8 2  It
invites an inquiry, which Justice Douglas readily provides, while himself
disclaiming its relevance, not into the nature of the Amish religion but into
the "misdemeanor or felony records of its members. 8 3 While Douglas
tries to deny Amish the status of heroic bulwarks against the chaos and
decay of the counterculture, Burger insists, all the while enacting a
rhetorical denial, that the Amish are "odd," "even erratic" and "differ-
ent.",84 They are odd precisely because they are different from the selves
we have regrettably become; they are, in fact, what we once were and what
Burger believes we should aspire to become once again. The Amish serve
as carriers of values whose place and power we will once again recognize
at the end of our own "Middle Ages." Their values are a constant reminder
that "today's majority" may not be a true embodiment of the character and
way of life that Burger believes provide a recognizably American identity.
79. Id. at 216.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Michael McConnell suggests that the First Amendment was intended to provide for exemptions
for such groups. See Michael McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise
of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
83. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 246. Burger's portrait of what he calls the "virtuous and admirable" way
of life of the Amish, id. at 215, is challenged by Douglas who cites testimony to the effect that drinking
among Amish youth is quite common, that the "rate of suicide is just as high, if not higher than for the
nation," and that the Amish have an unfortunate "preoccupation with filthy stories." Id. at 247 n.5.
All of this, Douglas somewhat ironically notes, indicates that the Amish are "not people set apart and
different." Id. They have, in Douglas's view, neither escaped nor transcended the decadence of the
sixties; they have merely covered it in a charade of difference.
84. Id. at 224.
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The opinions of Waite and Burger provide examples of two different
ways American law deals with difference.85 The former exaggerates the
disordering potential of difference as well as the orderly potential of
sameness and identity in order to justify an overtly colonial response.
Disorderly difference must be obliterated by the civilizing hand of a
coherent and stable state legality; the savage potential in difference must
be recognized so that the priority of an ordered civilization can be asserted
against the disordering difference. The latter denies difference while
seeming to embrace it. The problem of order is displaced through a
process of identification. If there is a disordering recognition in the
confrontation with the difference of the Amish lifestyle, it is, in Burger's
view, the recognition of a society in decline, a society called back to its
true self through the strange confrontation with the living representatives
of its abandoned way of life. The disorderliness of difference disappears
as difference itself is rendered invisible.
Despite their rhetorical dissimilarity, the opinions of Waite and Burger
share an essential commonality in that "neither engages the enigma of
othemess. '' 86  As Connolly argues, these two types of responses to
disorderly difference, one imperial, the other assimilationist, both
operate as contending and complementary strategies that enable a
superior people to maintain its self-assurance by bringing an inferior
people under its domination and tutelage. These two modes function
together as premises and signs of superiority; each supports the other
in the effort to erase the threat that difference presents .... 87
In contrast to the imperial and assimilationist approaches, we believe that
a new language for speaking about difference, one that does not construct
difference as a threat, needs to be developed. In other words, what is
needed is not only a reconceptualization of difference, but also a
re-construction of how we speak about order. Before difference can be
recognized and accommodated, we must stop seeing difference as the
prelude to disorder. And, we must stop seeing order as exclusive of all
difference. At present, our prevailing public philosophies do not provide
us with a vocabulary that adequately accomplishes either of these goals.
Before identifying a perspective that does lay the groundwork for a richer
account of difference and order, we discuss in the next section the
85. Our choice of Reynolds and Yoder as cases with which to write about difference may be
surprising. Both involve claims for tolerance by religious groups who are themselves often intolerant
of certain of their members. But we believe that by using these cases to present our thesis that
difference needs to theorize order, we can more easily illustrate the claim that difference and order are
compatible. One should not assume, however, that the same treatment of claims for the recognition and
accommodation of difference is absent when those claims are made by nonreligious groups.
86. CoNNOLLY, supra note 16, at 43.
87. Id.
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shortcomings of the two dominant vocabularies-liberalism and civic
republicanism.
III. VOCABULARIES OF DIFFERENCE
To be an American, as Reynolds and Yoder illustrate, is to live an
ambivalent relationship to difference.88 It is to be a neighbor to difference
and, at the same time, to harbor suspicions that difference may be our
national undoing. This ambivalence is conveyed by the metaphor of the
melting pot, which acknowledges and celebrates our differences, but also
insists on the painful process of melting down those differences and
molding a new and homogenized society.
In spite of our nation's proclivity toward homogeneity, difference is an
integral part of American culture. Difference and the conflict difference
generates have been a part of the cultural life of Americans since the
nation's founding. As Tocqueville observed at the start of the nineteenth
century:
The human beings who are scattered over this space do not form, as
in Europe, so many branches of the same stock. Three races, naturally
distinct, and, I might almost say, hostile to each other are discoverable
amongst them at the first glance. Almost insurmountable barriers had
been raised between them by education and law, as well as by their
origin and outward characteristics; but fortune has brought them
together on the same soil, where, although they are mixed, they do not
amalgamate .... 90
Regardless of the extent to which the now many races, religions, and
nationalities that compose the United States have or have not amalgamated,
the perception and fear that America would be a nation of many peoples
who would not unify has prompted a strong desire for sameness and
88. See Milton M. Gordon, Models of Pluralism: The New American Dilemma, 454 ANNALS 178
(1981). See also Robert Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and the Law: Pornography, Blasphemy and the
First Amendment, 76 CAL. L. REV. 297 (1988).
89. While we sympathize with those who have recently tried to challenge the melting pot metaphor
as assimilationist and racist and sought to replace it with alternatives like the American mosaic or the
American Kaleidoscope (see LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, THE AMERICAN KALEIDOSCOPE: RACE, ETHNICITY,
AND THE CIVIC CULTURE (1990), cited in Andrew Delbanco, Pluralism and its Discontents, 55
TRANSITION 83 (1992), the melting pot remains a powerful metaphor for many Americans' conceptions
about difference and order. Opponents of multiculturalism and ethnic plurality, for example, often
frame the debate in these terms. See, e.g., SCHLESINGER, supra note 14.
90. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 40, at 425. While the continuing appeals to difference and pluralism
suggest that the now numerous American races and ethnicities have not fully amalgamated, they are no
longer naturally distinct. Both genetically and culturally, America's many racial groups have interacted
with and molded into one another to the point where it is often difficult if not impossible to distinguish
black from white, Caribbean from North American, Muslim from Jew, etc. See, e.g., Adrian Piper,
Passing for White, Passing for Black, 58 TRANSITION 4 (1993). Piper acknowledges that both
genetically and culturally the differences between Blacks and whites are diminishing; at the same time,
however, she argues that our collective unwillingness to give up our stable racial identities-our refusal
to "reinternalize the external scapegoat"-is the "last outpost of racism." Id. at 20-21.
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community. This desire is evident in such disparate sources as John Jay's
quite un-Tocquevillian celebration of our unity and in the aspirations of
contemporary communitarians.9 It creates what Michael Kanmnen calls
"a dialectic of pluralism and conformity [which lies] at the core of
American life. 9 z  While embracing freedom and diversity, Americans
value connection; we strive to remain individuals, but we also wish to be
a people.93
For a nation with such a rich (if inconsistent) historical, literary, and
artistic tradition of celebrating difference, Americans typically speak about
difference in one or another cramped vocabulary. We have few ways to
label and speak of difference except to mark it as a threat to order or to
wish for its end. This observation is not obvious; on the contrary, one
could argue that tolerance provides a powerful and proven vocabulary for
speaking about difference. Indeed, many Americans pride themselves on
being tolerant of difference, even of those who are themselves intolerant.
Ideally, this means that differences are not merely accepted, but that they
are sought out and celebrated.
However, tolerance is at best a minimal vocabulary of difference.94
Tolerance receives its substantive understanding and its resulting inadequa-
cies from the two theories that dominate American political discourse:
liberalism 95 and civic republicanism. 96  For liberals, tolerance is the
91. Communitarianism, which has gained popularity of late as a response to liberalism's inability
to account for the human need for community, does not avoid the fear of disorder we have attributed
to both liberalism and republicanism. Simply transferring the problem of order to small, largely
self-sufficient communities cannot solve the problem of plurality. As Roberto Unger puts it, "Once
plurality is granted, all the problems of liberal thought seem to spring up again with the difference that
they apply to the relations among members of different communities rather than to every encounter
among individuals." ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 282 (1984).
92. See MICHAEL KAMMEN, PEOPLE OF PARADOX: AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 128 (1972).
93. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
94. We agree with Kirstie McClure that it is high time for a critical look at the practice of tolerance
as adequate for recognizing and accommodating difference. See McClure, supra note 31, at 362. Yet,
we do not seek to abandon tolerance as a fruitful concept simply because it often has been and is used
in ways inconsistent with the fullest meaning of respect and accommodation of others. It may very well
be that tolerance is, according to its ideal usage, respect for and accommodation of difference, and
simultaneously is, substantively, a gross reformism in the service of power. While these appear to be
contradictory definitions, they need not be. In this we follow the suggestion of Hannah Pitkin; Pitkin
argues that a large class of words, like justice, can often mean two very different things, both of which
are true. The two meanings correspond not to different words, but to a distinction between form and
substance depending upon the context in which the word is used. See HANNAH FENICHEL PITKIN,
WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE 186-92 (1973). See also HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN
214-15 (1964).
95. The classic texts are THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books
1968) (1651) and JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
University Press 1988) (1690). Although there are many varieties of liberalism, we emphasize common
themes that reveal liberalism's problematic relationship to difference.
96. See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); PHILIP SELZNICK, THE
MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY (1992). See also H.
Jefferson Powell, Reviving Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1703 (1988).
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bastion protecting individual freedom from government interference.97 For
civic republicans, tolerance frequently becomes a substantive conception of
the civic good, a form of civic virtue, to which the republic can aspire.98
In this way, then, liberals and civic republicans-at least in contemporary
debates-are nearly indistinguishable.99  Both imagine tolerance as
necessary in a democracy to allow participation and innovation in the
collective pursuit of truth.'0° Yet, although liberalism and civic republi-
canism purport to balance the competing imperatives of freedom and order,
both are ultimately deeply hostile to difference because they construct
difference as disorderly. In this section we argue that liberalism and civic
republicanism are each committed to understanding difference as the
antithesis of order; neither, therefore, can support a substantive conception
of tolerance that approaches the ideal of respecting and accommodating
differences.
A. Liberalism
Liberalism, as has often been noted, advances an individualistic
conception of human nature in which the individual is primary within
modem states.'0 ' This individualism is rights-based and interest-orient-
ed.'02 For a liberal, individual personality is defined outside of groups
or communities, which are seen as the locus of a threatening pressure to
conform. 10 3  Furthermore, all values are subjective; indeed, in liberal
thought, they are virtually indistinguishable from preferences. 1°4 Thus the
97. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1972).
98. See Michelman, supra note 96.
99. While we portray, for analytical reasons, liberal and civic republican theories as the two
dominant political theories in American thought, we believe it to be more accurate to understand the
liberalism/republicanism debate as representing similar arguments justifying the maintenance of
centralized state power. For examples of other arguments concerning the convergence of liberalism and
civic republicanism, see Naomi Stolzenberg, 'He Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out': Assimilation,
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 582, 655-60 (1993);
DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE LIMIT 3-8 (1992).
100. See MILL, supra note 37; Michelman, supra note 96, at 1526-27, 1528-32.
101. This point is made vividly by GEORGE KATEB, THE INNER OCEAN: INDIVIDUALISM AND
DEMOCRATIC CULTURE (1992).
102. See C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: FROM
HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962). Interest-oriented behavior is legitimated and protected through the
recognition of negative rights. For a liberal, life at its best consists in being left alone to identify and
strive to attain one's own interest. In such a life, what any individual wants represents the full measure
of his capacity to know the good. See MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE
(1988); see also Stephen Lukes, Making Sense of Moral Conflict, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE
127 (Nancy Rosenblum ed., 1989). As a result, no one, in the pre-political world as imagined by
liberalism, can be justified in prescribing the good for others.
103. See MILL, supra note 37.
104. Few liberal thinkers go so far as to equate value and preference. Liberal and analytic
jurisprudence have, as Drucilla Cornell argues, long since abandoned an insistence on purely subjective
legitimation of values. When liberals propose standards such as tolerance (Rawls), civility (Selznick)
or partiality (Nagel) to distinguish values from preferences, they begin to sound like contemporary civic
republicans. See CORNELL, supra note 99, at 3-8. However, when, as liberals frequently do, they deny
the existence of objective moral criteria, whatever restraints are imposed on individual freedom appear
19941
23
Sarat and Berkowitz: Disorderly Differences
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1994
308 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 6: 285
good is inevitably different for different people, and any sharing of values
is merely the coincidental overlapping of preferences. Liberalism can offer
no conception of the good except that individuals should be allowed to
identify and pursue their own particular visions of it with minimal outside
interference. 10 5 As a result, tolerance of those who hold opposing views
is considered the "fixed star of American Jurisprudence"'06 and the
bulwark of liberalism's notions of freedom and fairness.
107
Liberal tolerance, as described here, shares a positive feature with all
vocabularies of difference: it is a relativizing perspective. Relativization, or
perspectivism, acknowledges that people can be different from oneself and
yet not be inferior.' Without perspectivism, those who do not speak
your language or worship your gods must be viewed as barbarians.' °9
With perspectivism, others can be understood to worship gods and speak
a language true for them. As a concept that, at least in theory, seeks to
allow others to live according to their own moral and religious truths,
tolerance fosters co-existence and moderation instead of an imposed
virtue."0
However, although tolerance is relativistic, it is also hierarchical.
Tolerance is "permission granted by authority" and an "allowance, with or
without limitations, by the ruling power," and the allowing of "that which
is not actually approved; forbearance; sufferance."' Tolerance presup-
poses a hierarchical relationship between someone who requests tolerance,
and the authority that tolerates at will. Tolerance presupposes one powerful
actor-namely the liberal state-that can decide whether or not to tolerate
arbitrary and unnatural. While liberalism frees the individual moral agent from the teleology of
objective or shared moral judgments, it fails to provide a new justification for any individual moral
judgments. Without some sort of justification for the status of subjective moral judgments, those
judgments will be seen as nothing more than assertions of individual will without any moral validity.
Thus, values can be seen to be equivalent to preferences.
105. See SANDEL, supra note 102.
106. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
107. See RAwLS, supra note 97, at 206-07. Rawls argues that
equal liberty of conscience is the only principle that the persons in the original position can
acknowledge.... The question of equal liberty of conscience is settled. It is one of the fixed points
in our considered judgments of justice. But precisely because of this fact it illustrates the nature of
the argument for the principle of equal liberty. The reasoning in this case [religious liberty] can be
generalized to apply to other freedoms.
Id.
108. See TODOROV, supra note 20, at 189-91; see also, TZVETAN TODOROV, ON HUMAN
DIVERSITY: NATIONALISM, RACISM, AND EXOTICISM IN FRENCH THOUGHT 32-90 (1993) [hereinafter
TODOROV, ON HUMAN DIGNITY].
109. Todorov illustrates the workings of perspectivism by quoting Las Casas quoting Saint Paul:
'There are, it may be, so many kinds of voices in the world, and none of them is without
signification. Therefore if I know not the meaning of the voice, I shall be unto him that speaketh
a barbarian, and he that speaketh shall be a barbarian unto me.' Thus, just as we consider the
peoples of the Indies barbarians, they judge us to be the same, because they do not understand us.
TODOROV, supra note 20, at 191.
110. Todorov links tolerance to Montesquieu's concept of moderation. See TODOROV, ON HUMAN
DIGNITY, supra note 108, at 359.
111. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, cited in McClure, supra note 31, at 362.
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the activities of other, less powerful subjects. Tolerance is thus less a
vocabulary of difference than an apology for order."2
The transformation of "tolerance as a celebration of difference" into
"tolerance as a language of order" is a corollary of liberalism's individualist
and interest-oriented conception of human personality: this conception can
provide no assurance that difference will not be destructive and disorderly.
Thus, liberalism both advocates tolerance-because it is essential to
guarantee the freedoms necessary for the full realization of the human
character-and circumscribes the scope of tolerance for fear of aggravating
conflict and disorder."3 Liberals, therefore, describe societies as com-
prised of free individuals whose pursuit of their own vision of the good is
inevitably dangerous to society as a whole. However, through collective
appeal to a rationally governed civic realm, liberals imagine that disorderly
differences can be made orderly.14
For liberals, the state is the only source of that rational governance and
thus the only guarantor of order. The primary responsibility of the liberal
state is to do the job that cannot be done elsewhere: policing the behavior
of self-interested, utility-maximizing citizens to insure that each remains
free to pursue his own good in his own way."5 For this reason, liberal
social institutions, such as the law, are intended to protect us from one
another rather than improve human character. Thus, the existence of these
institutions signify both our differences and our inability to live harmoni-
ously with difference. Difference is inevitable and inevitably an invitation
to disorder. This is to be expected: if freedom is understood as the pursuit
of individual desires, as it is in liberal political thought, then order requires
that limits be imposed on individuals whose claims to freedom may give
rise to mutual antagonism.
Because order requires that the liberal state adjudicate differences by
constraining individual freedom, a request for exemption from state law in
112. The complicity between tolerance and power has led some to question its desirability as a
vocabulary for organizing difference. Despite its rhetorical association with respect for difference,
liberal tolerance, say its critics, has itself become a guarantor of order. For example, Herbert Marcuse
argues that tolerance stifles nonconformist attitudes and protects the authority of those who get to
choose which differences are tolerated. Herbert Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in A CRITIQUE OF
PURE TOLERANCE 82 (Robert P. Wolff ed., 1965). Audre Lorde eloquently writes of how "[a]dvocating
the mere tolerance of difference between women is the grossest reformism." Audre Lorde, The
Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in SISTER OUTSIDER 111 (1984). And
Tzvetan Todorov suggests that tolerance is often nothing more than a forbearance of a despised or hated
people whom one hopes to assimilate. TODOROV, supra note 20. These views suggest that tolerance,
as a vocabulary of difference, may not be as rich a vocabulary as its liberal supporters claim. Marcuse,
Lorde, and Todorov share the recognition that despite liberal rhetoric, tolerance presupposes and accepts
the legitimacy and authority of the state.
113. As Roberto Unger puts it, liberal "individuals seek to achieve their particular objectives and
to satisfy their needs.... Both hostility and dependence are based on the nature of human ends and
the scarcity of means to satisfy them." UNGER, supra note 91, at 65.
114. See LOCKE, supra note 95; HOBBES, supra note 95.
115. See MILL, supra note 37; see also Michael Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the
Unencumbered Self, 12 POL. THEORY 81 (1984).
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the name of difference must be seen as an invitation to the very disorderli-
ness that the liberal state is established to prevent. Moreover, because in
liberal political thought the ultimate justificatory statement is "I want,"
there is no vocabulary with which it might be possible to engage in
common reflection about questions of values raised by claims of difference.
As Roberto Unger and others have suggested," 6 liberalism denigrates
attachments among persons through which our collective life is constituted.
Liberals need and fear others-but are always more fearful than needy."7
For liberals, the recognition of difference is thus inevitably a recognition
of danger." 8 Differences proliferate as persons pursue their visions of the
good; differences always threaten to give rise to disorderly conflicts of
interest. Any apparent sharing of values and commitments is fleeting or
illusory, because lurking just beneath the surface is the reality of interests
in conflict.
B. Civic Republicanism
Unlike liberalism, civic republicanism does not begin with the isolated
individual struggling to realize his interests in a world where others are
similarly engaged in the pursuit of their own interests." 9 For the civic
republican, the primary condition of social life is life with others in pursuit
of the "common good." If liberalism elevates individual difference, civic
republicanism seeks to overcome difference in the name of a communal
civic virtue' 20
Central to the republicans' attempt to define civic virtue for a community
is their belief that subjectivity itself is discursively constructed within
communities. For the republican, the individual is inseparable from and
unknowable outside of her community. 2' As Paul Kahn maintains:
116. See UNGER, supra note 91; SANDEL, supra note 102.
117. This theme is most powerfully developed by Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's
Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 221 (1979). As Kennedy argues, "the categories of individual
and collective ... represent an insuperable contradiction within our experience." For a different
evaluation of the same tension see Note, Reinterpreting the Religion Clauses: Constitutional
Construction and Conceptions of the Self, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1468 (1984).
118. See Craft, supra note 10.
119. See Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986); see
also MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10
(1988).
120. See SELZNICK, supra note 96, at 406-27; Michelman, supra note 96; Cass Sunstein, Beyond
the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
121. Political life is a life with others forging commonality through the shared search for virtue.
Life together is just that; it is life where the "personhood, and character gain substance from the
experience of belonging to a specific moral community." SELZNICK, supra note 96, at 228. Unlike the
liberal ideal of isolated, free persons each pursuing their own good, the civic republican believes
individual identity to be inseparable from the life of the community. SANDEL, supra note 102. See also
Charles Taylor, Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate, in LI3ERALISM AND THE MORAL
LIFE, supra note 102, at 159. Difference is a barrier, but not an insurmountable one, to an integrated,
harmonious community life. And community is more thickly constituted than a temporary association
of persons in suspicious and temporary alliances for similar goals. To say that people are members of
[Vol. 6: 285
26
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol6/iss2/7
Sarat & Berkowitz
Instead of the problematic relationship of part (citizen) to whole
(state), in which either the part or the whole threatens to subsume the
other, the new communitarians understand the relationship of the
individual to the political order as that of the microcosm to the
macrocosm. . . . There is no self to understand apart from the
community just as there is no community apart from the members.
122
For civic republicans, both individual citizens and their communities are
constituted through a dialogue about justice. 23  Thus, dialogue is also
the mechanism by which difference is overcome; difference is something
to be subordinated in the search for shared understandings. 24 The threat
of disorder that plagues liberalism is ostensibly overcome as difference
itself is overcome. Thus while contemporary civic republicans often claim
to honor dialogue, plurality, and tolerance--concepts that imply accommo-
dation of difference-they simultaneously affirm the possibility of reaching
a consensus regarding the normative presuppositions of society.' 2' The
normative basis of this common good is created through the processes that
forge and sustain community. In particular, civic republicans argue that
through the process of founding and creating laws diverse individuals are
integrated into a coherent and unified community.
In this process, law plays a critical role in maintaining a dialogue geared
to defining civic virtue within the community. Law is more than a structure
of restraint, setting the boundaries within which individuals pursue their
self-interest. It is a vehicle for, and an expression of, the shared values of
the community. 26  Law becomes a "true foundation of the social order.
... The problems of order and freedom would be cast in a different light
if we could think of these norms of conduct as ends whose fulfillment
would bring our worthiest capacities to their richest development rather
than as constraints imposed by an external will.'
127
Civic republicanism is deeply hostile to difference. 21 It posits values,
or the pursuit of values, that can bring unity out of apparent diversity and,
in this way, denies the desirability of maintaining and supporting meaning-
a community is to say that their very personalities, their characters, values, and interests, are constituted
in and through the community of which they are a part.
122. Paul Kahn, Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. 1. 5 (1989).
123. See Bruce Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J. PHIL. 5 (1989).
124. See Michelman, supra note 96, at 1513; Sunstein, supra note 120, at 1552.
125. See Michelman, supra note 96, at 1510-15. See also Stolzenberg, supra note 99.
126. See Robert Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); SELZNICK,
supra note 96, at 452-55; Michelman, supra note 96, at 1513-15.
127. UNGER, supra note 91, at 76-77.
128. Iris Young, Polity and Group Differences: A Critique of Universal Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250
(1989). Yet some argue that modem versions of civic republicanism merely reinscribe a liberal desire
to confine difference to the private sphere. See Stolzenberg, supra note 99, at 634-67. Stolzenberg
argues that because civic republicanism usually selects liberal tolerance as the universal civic virtue for
which it seeks a consensus, it shares liberalism's inability to seriously consider the debate over the
assimilation and tolerance of right-wing religious groups.
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ful difference. Because individual freedom is subordinated to the
community's prescriptive demands, civic republicanism can only accom-
plish its goal of establishing communal criteria for moral judgments at the
expense of diversity. Civic republicans assert that a national community
can and should be forged out of a diversity of interests.'29 Disorderly
differences are overcome if dialogue succeeds in forging a societal
consensus concerning civic virtue.
While liberalism anxiously acknowledges and seeks to make the best of
difference, civic republicanism seeks to overcome and quiet it. While the
former treats difference as the irreducible fact of political life, the latter
sees difference as epiphenomenal. Yet both liberalism and civic republi-
canism confront difference as a problem of disorder, and neither appreciates
the way difference may already contain the seeds of its own orderli-
ness. 130  Neither uses the fact of difference to reevaluate and revalue
order itself, to ask what it means to demand or to search for order among
diverse and overlapping perspectives, cultures, and values. Neither
provides a vocabulary that both welcomes difference and responds to
legitimate demands for order.
As Reynolds and Yoder suggest, American law sees difference in the
cramped vocabularies of liberalism and civic republicanism. Our law
knows no way to celebrate difference as a site of alternative visions of
orderliness or to recognize the potential within differences to instruct others
about useful realignments in existing practices.' 3' For this reason, social
theory must do more than condemn law for its fantastic imagination of
difference as disaster or for its repressive, homogenizing preoccupations.
Social theorists should instead provide a richer, more complicated vision
of difference and develop a richer, more complicated vision of order.
IV. CONCLUSION
"[Tihe other," Todorov claims, "remains to be discovered.'
' 32
[H]uman life is confined between.., two extremes, one where the I
invades the world, and one where the world ultimately absorbs the I.
•... And just as the discovery of the other knows several degrees,
from the other-as-object, identified with the surrounding world, to the
129. Larry G. Simon, The New Republicanism: Generosity of Spirit in Search of Something to Say,
29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 83, 91 (1987).
130. This argument is made by Stanley Fish in his essay, Force, in DOING WHAT COMES
NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES
(1989).
13 1. For a discussion of the way difference invites reconsideration of institutional practices see
Minow, supra note 7.
132. TODOROV, supra note 20, at 247.
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other-as-subject, equal to the I but different from it... we can indeed
live our lives without ever achieving a full discovery of the other.
1 33
We cannot, at this point, identify a vocabulary of difference that speaks
about order in a fully responsible way and, in so doing, makes it possible
to "discover the other" in the sense that Todorov advocates. We can,
however, conclude by pointing to a fruitful body of scholarship from which
such a vocabulary might be drawn. This body of scholarship reconfigures
the problem of difference by reconceiving both the liberal and civic
republican hierarchies of state and society. This is the scholarship of legal
pluralism, a burgeoning interdisciplinary field that draws upon anthropolo-
gy, political science, economics, and law.
134
While the advocates of legal pluralism represent a wide range of
concerns and opinions, they share the conviction that power, order, and
meaning are not the exclusive province of hierarchical command-obedience
relationships. 35  Power, and the concomitant capacity for ordered social
and political institutions, can and do exist outside and separate from
relations of coercion and hierarchy. Legal pluralists, consequently, paint
a picture of order and difference in stark contrast to that suggested by
liberal and civic republican theorists. Instead of fearing difference as
disorderly and as a threat to central authority, legal pluralists take the
possibility of difference seriously and intend to honor it. A legally pluralist
society is not limited to one civil realm dominated by a neutral state.
Instead, the task of maintaining order is decentralized and dispersed
throughout society among different groups.
Some versions of legal pluralism argue, using anthropological research,
that different groups can exist without a central conglomeration of power
and without the formation of hierarchical relations privileging a central
bureaucracy over those diverse groups. Claustres, for example, maintains
that among the Tupi societies in Brazil autonomous social groups existed
without any central concentration of power and violence. 36  These
distinct groups interacted, traded, and "unified" in what Claustres calls a
multicommunity social organization, yet no centralized and hierarchical
arrangement arose among them. On the contrary, Claustres argues that the
emergence of any such centripetal force caused a symmetrical strengthening
133. Id.
134. See Cover, supra note 126; PIERRE CLAUSTRES, SOCIETY AGAINST THE STATE (1987); JOHN
COMAROFF & JEAN COMAROFF, ETHNOGRAPHY AND THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION 54-56 (1992);
ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); Peter
Fitzpatrick, Marxism and Legal Pluralism, I J. L. & SoC'Y 45 (1983); Stewart Macaulay, Private
Government, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 445 (Leo Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986); Sally
E. Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC'Y REV. 869 (1988); Sally F. Moore, Law and Social Change:
The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 L. & SOC'Y REV. 719 (1973).
135. We borrow the phrase "command-obedience relationships" from CLAUSTRES, supra note 134,
at 11.
136. Id. at 71.
1994]
29
Sarat and Berkowitz: Disorderly Differences
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1994
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
of centrifugal forces among the various Tupi communities. In other words,
the dynamic Claustres describes is dialectical: as the social system
gradually constructs and defines itself, its component parts react to this
change by accentuating their concrete and special nature, their individuality.
Though some might wish to try, it is hard to imagine how Claustres's
model could be transposed onto contemporary societies such as the United
States.37  While liberal theory may underestimate the order inherent in
difference, one should not merely make the opposite claim that conversa-
tion and negotiation can adequately resolve all conflicts that arise. As the
story of Tina Isa demonstrates, there remain differences in our society that
can be "ordered" only by violent imposition. Unless legal pluralists are
content to let competing autonomous groups resolve these extreme
differences outside the scope of institutional power, they must continue to
depend on a hierarchical structure--e.g., the state-that is authorized by its
constituent groups to resolve disputes among them.
Robert Cover's model of legal pluralism confirms this fact.'38 While
Cover takes difference seriously, he recognizes that pluralism does not, and
need not, unconditionally honor all forms of difference. His brand of legal
pluralism recognizes and accommodates difference when two conditions are
met.
First, difference must arise out of and express the normative aspirations
of an integrated and ordered community-it must exemplify and express a
"nomos."' 39  In this sense, Cover's legal pluralism embraces the liberal
celebration of multiplicity, but in a way that insists that the claims of
difference be linked to the requisites of a richly constituted, normatively
engaged orderliness.
140
Second, claims of difference should be honored only when they
themselves honor the principle of difference they assert. This condition for
recognizing and accommodating difference also puts order at the fore.
Under this condition, legal pluralism insists on the reality of plurality as
itself providing a constraint on those versions of difference that would press
themselves upon us.'4 ' Legal pluralism does not require that those of us
sympathetic to the claims of cultural difference stand by as all manner of
horrors are committed in its name. We can, and should, insist that
137. Similar studies of other nonindustrial societies, as well as communities within industrial and
bureaucratized states like the United States, confirm Claustres's argument that order can be maintained
in society where the state provides wide latitude for group differences. See id. at 150; ELLICKSON,
supra note 134; FITZPATRICK, supra note 43; Macaulay, supra note 134.
138. See Cover, supra note 126.
139. Id.
140. For further discussion of Cover's vision of legal pluralism, see Austin Sarat and Thomas R.
Kearns, Making Peace with Violence: Robert Cover on Law and Legal Theory, in LAW'S VIOLENCE,
(Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns eds.,1992).
141. See McClure, supra note 31, at 361. See also Martha Minow, Putting Up, Putting Down:
Tolerance Reconsidered, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM 77 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1990).
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difference be orderly, even as we invite questions about what order entails.
And we can, and should, insist that the claims of "equal but different"
honor principles of equality and of difference.'42
From this perspective, what is sought in both Reynolds and Yoder is the
right of a discrete community to live according to its own nomos.
Recognition of that claim does not entail agreement or even sympathy. It
is possible to accommodate the Mormon rule requiring polygamy or the
Amish attitude toward schooling without advocating those positions. In our
terms, Cover's legal pluralism may make such differences orderly by
recognizing and accommodating them as differences that arise out of the
shared activities of communities united in their pursuit of a particular
conception of the good. Cover calls this pursuit law; and he counsels
against assertions of authority that claim the right to annihilate another's
law. 143
Like liberalism, legal pluralism is sensitive to the subjectivity of values;
like civic republicanism, legal pluralism aspires to shared moral engage-
ment. It is in the interstices of these traditions, however, that legal
pluralism departs from entrenched discourse and lays the groundwork for
a much needed reconciliation of difference and order.144  However,
resisting the trend of established jurisprudence and political theory to carve
a space for orderly difference is no small task. As a result, legal pluralism
may not provide the ultimate answer to the vexing problems posed by
difference. As the Western nation-states are increasingly populated by
individuals with heterodox social affiliations-including those from
Diaspora cultures-legal pluralism's contribution is especially valuable in
its encouragement of orderly difference. Each non-separate order must
recognize and respect the other as "other," but not wholly alien. Of course,
as long as there exist groups for whom someone else's gods are not God,
there will be the need for some mechanism to intervene and assert its
authority. The task of social theory is to provide a vocabulary for
142. As Cover's critics have pointed out, he makes his argument for tolerance easier by selecting
examples that are "easy." These critics look to the cases like those of Tina Isa and Salman Rushdie
and ask if Cover intends to recognize the authority of the Palestinian and Islamic communities to
enforce their laws on their people around the world. The case of Salman Rushdie is especially difficult
because Rushdie's decision to retain his Islamic identity eclipses the answer that a community's law
must recognize the possibility of exit. See Jeremy Waldron, Rushdie and Religion, in JEREMY
WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991, at 134 (1993). It is unlikely that Cover
or the vast majority of Western individuals are willing to accept the justness of the fatwa; yet to reject
it requires an assertion of our authority to judge Islamic law.
143. Cover, supra note 126.
144. We have concentrated at length on the Reynolds and Yoder opinions not to register our
agreement or disagreement with the decisions. Polygamy is a complicated issue that involves the
consideration of gender, oppression, and slavery as opposed to, in this case, Reynolds's claim against
the state for the freedom to practice the dictates and lifestyles of his religion. But even if the ban on
polygamy is to be sustained, the fear of disorder cannot be the rationale. The Mormons practiced
polygamy as part of their law. Their claim for the right to continue that practice is a claim not of
freedom and license, but a claim to live according to a different law.
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reconciling claims of difference with legitimate demands for order so that
occasions for such intervention and assertion are minimized and respect for
difference encouraged.
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